We appear to be on the horns of a dilemma with respect to the criteria for consciousness. Phenomenological criteria are valid by definition but do not appear to be scientific by the usual yardsticks. Behavioral criteria are scientific by definition but are not necessarily valid.
for the possibility of unconscious experiences. 3 If we take this route, though, we should be ready to say what, besides carrying information about x, makes an internal state of S an experience of x?
If a state needn't be conscious to be an experience, and allergic reactions to ragweed are not to count as experiences of ragweed, what additional properties of information-bearing states make them experiences of x? This is by no means an easy question to answer, but, guided by the way we conceive of conscious experiences of external objects, two additional requirements can be imposed: (1) the information in these states should be available for the control and guidance of action (if the experience is unconscious, of course, the actor need not be aware of this influence).
(2) the information should be extracted from stimulation (as it is with conscious experiences) by accredited receptor systems. 4 If information about x is extracted from light by the photosensitive pigment of the retina, for instance, and this information is available for the control or modification Perception Without Awareness 6 of behavior (reaching, pointing, grasping, identifying, describing) , then the state (activity, event) carrying this information is a visual experience of x. Whether or not it is a conscious experience is a separate question. What these two additional conditions give us is the following: E is a visual (auditory, etc.) experience of x in S if E carries information about x, the information is extracted from light by photoreceptors in S's eyes (from sound by acoustic receptors in S's ea rs, etc.), and this information is directly 5 available for control of S's actions. Allergic reactions to ragweed don't count as perceptions (experiences) of ragweed because the information they carry fails to meet at least one--probably both--of these added constraints. The information isn't extracted by an accredited receptor system, and even if it is (according to some more liberal interpretation of "receptor system"), this information is not directly available for the control and guidance of S's behavior. So although S receives information about ragweed, she does not perceive it-not even unconsciously.
Even with the additional qualifications to come in a moment (see below), this "test" for perception of an object is not going to withstand philosophical scrutiny. Too many loose ends and philosophically troublesome qualifiers. Nonetheless, I propose to adopt it here. As I read the literature, this test comes reasonably close to the usage of people involved in this research while remaining tolerably close to ordinary language -close enough, perhaps, to justify using words like see and hear for what is being described. We could, I suppose, use subscripts to distinguish this special usage--if it is, indeed, a special usage--but as long as we keep clearly in mind what we are describing with these perceptual terms, confusion can, I hope, be avoided.
There is, however, another respect in which even if information arrives over an accredited sensory channel and influences a person's behavior, this is not enough for perception. I receive information about the Middle East, about continued violence in that part of the world, not by Perception Without Awareness 7 seeing that part of the world, but by reading a newspaper in my living room. I don't have to see my gas tank to get information about it-that it is almost empty--through my eyes. What I actually see is the gas gauge, not the gas tank. Perception typically provides us with information about all sorts of objects we don't perceive. That is what instruments, radio, television, and newspapers (not to mention spies and informants) are for. They provide information about things we do not, perhaps cannot, ourselves perceive.
What is needed here, of course, is some principled distinction between direct and indirect perception. proper part of x, perception of x is not direct. It is indirect. If the information you get about x is embedded in information you get in a direct way about y, then it is y you perceive. You may come to know about and react to x, but it is y you see, hear, or smell. The information I get about the Middle East from the newspaper is derived or indirect information-information delivered via information about the newspaper--that the headlines say there is continued violence in that part of the world. Information obtained about objects directly in front of us is presumably not indirect in this way. When I read the newspaper in normal conditions, I see the newspaper not simply because I get information about it (I could get that by looking at a photocopy), but because the information I obtain about it is not embedded in information I get about some more proximal object.
6
I will not try to supply the required definition of direct perception. It would take us too far afield. I simply assume a satisfactory account is available. If my own account (Dretske 1981 ) is deemed unsatisfactory (Haugeland 1996 thinks it is), the reader is free to supply his or her own. If perception-conscious or unconscious-of physical objects (newspapers, gas gauges, people) is deemed possible, some such account must be presupposed.
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Finally, a word about how much information one must receive (in a direct way) about x in order to perceive x. It needn't be much. Some information is necessary, but it needn't be enough to identify x. One can, after all, see a gadzit at a distance in poor light. It looks the same as a variety of non-gadzits look at this distance and in this light -like a small speck on the horizon.
About the only information one gets in these conditions is information about its location. One can point at it. One can keep one's eye on it. One sees Venus in the night sky. It looks like a bright star. Without special instruments, information about the planet is not sufficient to identify it as a planet, not enough to distinguish it from a star. Nonetheless, one still gets information about it, information about its relative location in the night sky. In these circumstances, that is enough--enough, that is, to see it. In other circumstances (examining a bug under a microscope) one gets information about details of x without necessarily getting information about where x is (though one might know, on other grounds, where it is--in the lab, on the slide).
Pulling these ideas together, then, the proposed test for perception looks like this:
S perceives x = S has a perceptual experience (in our special inclusive sense) that provides (in a direct way) information about x.
From a scientific standpoint, one of the merits of T p is that it does not require or presuppose consciousness. So it avoids the vexing issues we are trying to defer until §2. It leaves open the possibility of perceiving something unconsciously-without awareness of it. Whether that is really possible depends, of course, on whether an acceptable test for awareness can be formulated that makes awareness of x something more than perception of x and, therefore, something possibly absent when a subject perceives x.
Conscious Awareness
"Much of the long-standing controversial status of the study of unconscious processing revolves around the lack of a general consensus as to what constitutes an adequate operational definition of conscious awareness" (Reingold and Toth 1996: 159 ). An operational definition (at least an operationally useful necessary condition) of conscious awareness (of a stimulus) is our next topic. What can plausibly be used as a test for awareness of x that can fail when (according to T p ) x is perceived?
As already seen (spy example), we cannot use the fact that S does not believe 7 she sees an F (or believes she does not see an F), and therefore sincerely reports not seeing an F, to show that S is not consciously aware of an F. S might not know what Fs are. She might be confused or just not know about the existence (or prevalence) of Fs and, therefore, believe (and say) she is not aware of an one when she is, without realizing it, staring one in the face. Or the F S sees may be so far away, or exposed so briefly, or in such bad light, that it is impossible for S to tell (identify) what it is. That doesn't mean she isn't aware of an F. It only means she doesn't know what it is she is aware of.
More promising than identification or recognition is detection of a stimulus. To detect an F one doesn't have to know it is an F. One has only to be able to tell the difference (distinguish or discriminate) between it (the F) being there (wherever one is looking) and its not being there.
One doesn't even have to be able to discriminate between Fs and non -Fs. Even if S doesn't believe in extraterrestrials and, as a result, refuses to believe she is seeing one (they look like large dandelions) in her front yard, S will be able to tell the difference between seeing one there ("Look at that huge dandelion!") and not seeing one there ("Its gone now"). If S can, in this way, tell the difference between the presence and absence of extraterrestrials (she needn't be able to But how do we tell whether S can distinguish (discriminate, tell the difference) between x's presence and its absence? Do we leave this up to S? If S sincerely says she can't tell the difference between the presence and absence of x, if, according to S, things look the same to her whether x is there or not, does that settle the matter? Why? Why should we leave this up to S? Maybe she really can "tell" the difference (and we could show this if we found the right way to probe S), but she doesn't realize she can. Maybe her standards for seeing something are too demanding. Maybe she is biased in some way or isn't able or doesn't like to report things she sees in her left visual field.
We are now entering murky territory, territory in which there is a di vergence of opinion amongst psychologists about what appropriate criteria are. We can't say, simply, that S can discriminate x's presence from its absence--hence, detect x--if x's presence makes a difference to S because this is equivalent to equating detection with perception of x. Making a difference to S is just a way of describing S as getting information about the presence of x. We may, in the end, want to declare unconscious perception a theoretical impossibility, but this seems too quick.
Many scientists prefer a subjective criterion for detection, a test in which S's judgments and consequent reports about what she (consciously 8 ) experiences or perceives (when they reflect a genuine power to detect the stimulus) define what S consciously experiences. Merikle (1984, 1986) clearly opt for this test in establishing subliminal perception: if a subject, asked to say whether anything is present, believes she is just guessing, then the stimulus is below S's subjective threshold of consciousness. S isn't conscious of the stimulus whether or not she is getting information about it. Of those stimuli S perceives, she is conscious of the ones she believes she is conscious of and not conscious of those she thinks she isn't. Restricting matters to st imuli S perceives 9 in location L (on the screen, in her left visual field, to the right of fixation point) we can express this subjective (superscript "s") test for awareness (subscript "a") as:
If S thinks (sincerely says) she is aware of x in L , she is aware of x; if she thinks (sincerely says) she isn't aware of anything in L, she isn't aware of x Two important clarifications:
1.
s T a is expressed not as a single condition necessary and sufficient for awareness, but as a dual sufficient condition: one sufficient for awareness, the other for lack of awareness. There is no proposed equivalence between awareness of a stimulus and thinking you are aware it. For good reason. We do not want to say of someone who perceives x that she is co nscious of x if and only if she believes (sincerely reports) she perceives x. That would make a judgment that you perceive x into a necessary condition for awareness of x. It isn't. Human infants and a great many animals, I
am assuming, are conscious of things around them. 10 They see, hear, and smell things in the same conscious way you and I do, but they do not (need not be able to) think or say that they are aware of them. They are conscious, yes, but, lacking conceptual sophistication, they do not think they are. Nor do they think they are not. Scientists have objected to s T a on the grounds that it places on the individual subject the responsibility for establishing the criterion of awareness. (Eriksen 1959 (Eriksen , 1960 292; Underwood and Bright 1996: 4; Merikle 1984) . It transfers responsibility for defining awareness (saying when a subject is aware of x) from the investigator to the subject of investigation.
. . . factors unrelated to awareness, such as demand characteristics and preconceived biases, may lead subjects to adopt a conservative response criterion and report null perceptual awareness even under conditions in which conscious perceptual information is available. Response bias represents a threat not only to the validity of the subjective report measure of awareness, but also to its reliability. In particular, variability in response criteria makes it difficult to compare reports of null subjective confidence across-subjects, or within-subjects across conditions. (Reingold and Toth 1996: 162) Such considerations led Eriksen (1959 Eriksen ( , 1960 to reject a subjective test as an adequate measure of awareness. He suggested, instead, that awareness be operationally defined in terms of performance on tasks that are independent of the subject's judgments about what she is or is not aware of. He urged the use of a forced-choice discrimination measure. Don't ask S whether she is aware of x or, if you do, don't take her word for it. If S doesn't think she can tell whether Perception Without Awareness 14 x is present, if she professes being unable to see anything at all (hence, according to s T a , being aware of nothing at all), she is asked ("forced") to choose anyway: is there something there or not? If S thinks she can't see anything, she is urged to guess. It turns out in some conditions that subjects who say and think they are guessing are nonetheless able to "tell" (in a statistically significant way) whether x is there. Their "guesses" are more often right than wrong. In a sense, then, these subjects are detecting x when they do not believe they can. Even when they believe they can't. If we adopt this objective measure of awareness, o T a , subjects can be conscious of a stimulus while thinking and sincerely saying they are aware of absolutely nothing at all. They are no longer authorities on whether they are conscious of something. out that S is aware of more than under the subjective test. If the objective test for awareness is used, perception without awareness still occurs (see Boornstein 1992: 193-94 , for a summary), but it occurs less often and is harder to demonstrate experimentally. Reingold and Merikle (1988 have argued that the validity of this objective test (as a test for awareness) depends on the plausibility of assuming that only stimuli S is aware of influence her discriminative responses. 12 If stimuli S is not aware of can affect S's decisions about whether x is present in an objective test for awareness, the objective test is not really a test for awareness. We don't want a test for S's awareness of x to allow things that S isn't aware of to affect the results that indicates awareness. Otherwise S needn't be aware of x to be co unted, by The use of the subjective test, s T a , is not only supported by raw conviction about what we mean to be talking about when we talk about awareness of a stimulus, it is also confirmed by a variety of theoretical approaches to the study of consciousness. I mention only two:
(1) Higher Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness (Armstrong 1968; Carruthers 1989 Carruthers , 2000 Dennett 1978; Lycan 1987 Lycan , 1992 Rosenthal 1986 Rosenthal , 1990 Rosenthal , 1991 maintain that S's experience of x is conscious if and only if, at some higher level, S is aware that she is having the experience. Lower order mental states (e.g., S's perceptual experience of x) become conscious (making perception of x conscious) by becoming the object of a higher order thought. This (2) Global Access Theories of consciousness (Baars 1988) N.G. was receiving information (in the right hemisphere) about the spoon--that it was a spoon.
How else explain her ability (this is no lucky guess; she consistently gets it right) to pick it out (with her left hand). So N.G. must (T p ) see the spoon. But is she aware of it? Does she have the same kind of experience of it--i.e., a conscious experience--as occurs when she reports seeing a cup in her right visual field? Well, if she is aware of the spoon, and we take her word for what she believes, she certainly doesn't believe, and in this sense is not aware , that she is aware of it.
If we take her verbal report as an honest and reliable expression of what she believes, then we are forced to conclude that N.G. believes she does not see a spoon on the left. She believes she being perceived? Normal subjects detect and name objects in the left visual field because, after initially projecting to the right hemisphere, information is relayed via the corpus collosum to the left hemisphere where the stimulus can then be named and described. N.G.'s commisurotomy (severance of the corpus collosum) makes this communication about the existence of conscious experience (in the right hemisphere) impossible, but why should that be taken to mean that there is no conscious experience there? Wouldn't that be like concluding that nothing is happening in Foggyville simply because a storm that knocks out communication facilities prevents our getting news of the events occurring there? Why not conclude with Palmer (1999: 632) that the most likely explanation of N.G.'s behavior is that each hemisphere is conscious of the object projected to it, but only the left hemisphere is able to talk about it? The right hemisphere has conscious experiences. It just can't say (and think?) so.
If this is the way we interpret this extraordinary situation, then into cerebral hemispheres with distinct streams of conscious experience, as we are now doing, we ought also split the person into distinct loci of judgment or belief: a left hemisphere capable of judging and talking about the experiences it is having (as evidenced by the person' s ability to report seeing a cup when the cup is in the right visual field) and a right hemisphere that, even if capable of making such judgments, is incapable of expressing them verbally. If we do this, then we do not have a violation of s T a . N.G.'s right hemisphere (in contrast to N.G.) does not judge (at least we have no evidence that it judges) that it is not aware of anything. N.G.'s right hemisphere may be like a human infant or an animal --aware of things but unable to report that it is (when it is) or that it isn't (when it isn't). We can take N.G.'s choice of a spoon with the left hand as a way of non-verbally reporting that there was, earlier, a spoon on the left, but this isn't yet a report that she was aware of a spoon (or anything else) on the left, and it is this report, a report (judgment) that she was aware of something on the left, that 
B. Change Blindness
Change blindness refers to the inability of subjects to detect visible--sometimes quite prominent--differences. If the change (producing these differences) occurs when the subject can't see it (e.g., during an eye saccade) or during a suitable distraction (e.g., a mud splat), the differences produced by this change are sometimes hard to detect. Pictures of people standing around a jet airplane differ in a certain obvious (once you notice it) way: one picture has one of the jet engines (a prominent part of the picture) missing. Shown these pictures in alternating sequence (with a suitable intervening mask) subjects have trouble seeing the difference.
To have a familiar sort of example to focus on, suppose S looks at a scene in which there are seven people gathered around a table. Each person is clearly visible. S gazes at the scene for several seconds, runs her eye over (and, in This conclusion doesn't mean that a person is always conscious of all the elements in a complex display. All it means is that one can be consciously aware of more than one realizes. If S looks (for several seconds) at seven hundred people in a room, seven thousand in a parade, or seventy thousand in a football stadium, she is unlikely to see everyone even if they are all clearly visible from her vantage point. The subjective impression of seeing hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of distinct elements, is (or may often be) an illusion. 19 These other (other than the ones attended to) objects may no more be seen (consciously or unconsciously) than are those objects whose image projects to the blind spot on the retina of a stationary eye (Dennett 1991) .
Maybe this is so, maybe it isn't. This is an empirical question. It depends, surely, on how much information about these objects one actually gets, and it is important to remember in this regard that not much information is needed to see an object. Information about color, for instance, is Perception Without Awareness 24
clearly not necessary or we wouldn't be able to see things at dusk. Information about an object's shape isn't necessary. Things look pretty much the same at 600 yards, at acute angles, and when one isn't wearing one's glasses. That doesn't prevent their being seen. All that is really needed to see x is enough information about x to enable one to point at x and ask, "What is that?" If you get this much information about x, you see x, and, it seems reasonable to say (given that you can point at x and ask, "What is that?") that this is perception with awareness. 20 Our question about whether S is conscious of Sam, then, might be put this way: when S looks the second time, is her experience of the group such that she could have wondered "Who is that?" where "that" refers to Sam? Since this seems clearly possible with other members of the group, why not for Sam? If it is so for Sam, then her perception of Sam is conscious perception even when she insists she sees no difference.
If this is the correct way to think about change blindness--at least some instances of change blindness--then what change blindness shows is that sometimes--perhaps often--we do not notice some of the things we are consciously aware of. It shows that conscious experiences of the world are sometimes richer, more variegated, more textured, than the judgment s one ends up making on their basis. It shows that "change blindness" might more correctly be described as a kind of "change amnesia" (Wolfe 1999: 74-75) , an inability to retain (for judgment and report) information that is consciously registered at the perceptual level. It shows (Potter 1999: 35) that only some of the information consciously registered is still available when the time for action (e,g. reporting what is seen) arrives. It shows that s T a is not a valid test for awareness of a stimulus.
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C. Attentional Deficits: Unilateral Neglect and Extinction.
Unilateral spatial neglect is a relatively common and disabling neurological disorder after unilateral brain damage. It is characterized by a lack of awareness for sensory events located towards the contralesional side of space (e.g., towards the left following a right lesion), together with a loss of the orienting behaviors, exploratory search and other actions that would normally be directed toward that side. Neglect patients often behave as if half of their world no longer exists. In daily life, they may be oblivious to objects and people on the neglected side of the room, may eat from only one side of their plate, read from only one end of a newspaper page, and make-up or shave only one side of their face. (Driver & Vuilleumier 2001: 40) In extinction, unlike full-blown neglect, a patient can see and report on objects on either side of the visual field without difficulty if these objects are shown one at a time. If shown two objects at once, though, one on the good side and one on the bad side, they will report seeing only the one on the good side. Experiences of objects on the good side extinguish experiences of objects on the bad side.
If we use s T a as our criterion for when a subject is conscious of a stimulus, then, since neglect patients insist they are not conscious of the objects they neglect (Driver and Vuilleumier 2001 : 45) we must conclude with Palmer (1999: 637) that even if (according to T p ) neglected objects are perceived (there is evidence that they are 21 ) they are not consciously perceived. The question we are asking now, though, is whether this is the right conclusion to draw. Could it be that these people are conscious of objects they say they don't see?
The reason one may be suspicious of the conclusion that patients are not aware of objects they neglect is that unlike blindsight where there is damage to the primary visual cortex, many of the neural pathways normally associated with conscious perception (including primary sensory areas) remain intact in neglect patients (Driver and Vuilleumier 2001: 45) . Furthermore, unlike blindsight, some neglect patients can report an isolated light wherever it appears in the visual field Perception Without Awareness 26 on either the good side or the bad side. What they can't do is report it on the left when there are (as there usually are in daily life) competing objects that "extinguish" it on the right. Nonetheless, despite the absence of report (and, presumably, belief) fMRI studies show that these extinguished objects on the left continue to activate the primary visual cortex and early extrastriate visual areas of the brain's right hemisphere in a manner similar to objects (when there is no competition from objects on the right) consciously seen on the left. As a result, Driver and Vuilleumier (2001: 66) are left wondering how these patients can possibly fail to be aware of the objects they neglect.
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There is, furthermore, substantial processing of information from "extinguished" objects beyond the primary visual cortex. Patients who report seeing nothing on the left can nonetheless make accurate judgments (they think they are guesses) about similarities and differences between objects presented simultaneously on the left and the right (Driver 1996: 200; Rafel and Robertson 1995) . When asked to report where objects appear (on the left, right, or both sides) right -parietal patients (who extinguish on the left) report seeing nothing on the left, but when they are asked to count these same stimuli (are you seeing a total of one, two, or four objects?), some patients had no difficulty including the extinguished objects on the left in the reported total (Vuilleumier and Rafal:1999 This way of describing the results is not mandatory, of course, but we are not now looking for the way these patients must be described. We are asking how best to describe them. Since discussion of both split brains and change blindness has opened up the possibility--indeed (in the case of change blindness) the plausibility-that people are aware of things they believe they are not aware of, this seems like an available option in the case of neglect also. Blindsight may provide a clue. Blindsighters perceive things (in our T p sense) without (unless told) realizing they perceive them. They normally believe they do not perceive objects in their scotoma (the "blind" portion of their visual field). They also exhibit striking cognitive and behavioral deficits with respect to these objects. If forced to guess or choose, they can more often than not correctly "say" whether x is vertical, blue, or moving (thereby exhibiting perception of (Clark 2001; Jacob and Jeannerod 2003) . This kind of picture also lies behind efforts by Dretske (1981 ), Evans (1982 ), and Tye (1995 , to conceive of perceptual experience (each is talking about conscious perceptual experience) as that portion of incoming information available to cognitive centers for fixation of belief (reasons to believe) and goal selection (reasons to do).
An Alternative
To make this kind of picture plausible, especially if it is to be couched in terms of reasons, we have to carefully distinguish explanatory reasons, the reasons why S does A or believes P, Perception Without Awareness 29 from justifying reasons, S's reasons for doing A or believing P, the reasons S (if able) might
give to justify doing A or believing P. Explanatory reasons are those facts that explain, or help explain, why something happens-including why people (or animals) do (or believe) the things they do. As such, explanatory reasons have to be true. You can't explain why Sarah takes her umbrella by citing heavy rain if, in fact, it isn't raining. If it isn't raining, that can't be the explanation, the reason why she is taking her umbrella. Justifying reasons, on the other hand, needn't be true. Even if it isn't raining, that it is raining can be S's justification, the reason she has and the reason she gives, for taking her umbrella. If she (justifiably) thinks it is raining, or if it sounds to her like it is raining, that it is raining can be the reason she has-and certainly the reason she gives--for taking her umbrella whether or not it is raining.
Explanatory reasons have to be true, justifying reasons needn't be true. Justifying reasons needn't be true because a justifying reason (as I am using the term here 24 ), unlike an explanatory reason, is the way the world, in either thought or experience, is represented to be. Since things do not have to be the way they are represented, since things are sometimes misrepresented, that it is raining can be S's reason for taking her umbrella even when it isn't raining. This "fact" (in scare quotes to indicate putative fact), qualifies as a reason for S to take her umbrella, even when it isn't raining, even when it isn't a fact, because from S's point of view it is represented as fact, as though it were true. It is, therefore, something whose falsity in no way diminishes an agent's rationality. From the agent's standpoint, a putative fact that is represented, in either thought or experience, to be a fact is, for purposes of both justification and motivation, as go od as a real fact. A sunny day disqualifies the putative fact that it is raining as an explanation of anything, and therefore disqualifies it as the reason why S takes her umbrella, but it doesn't disqualify it as S's reason for taking her umbrella.
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Although we cannot use what S believes--that it is raining--to explain why S believes P or does A when it isn't raining, we can use the fact that she believes it is raining or the fact that it sounds (looks, smells) like it is raining in our explanations of why S takes her umbrella. We can do this because unlike the putative fact that it is raining, that she believes it or that it sounds that way to her are genuine facts. She does believe it. It does sound that way to her. So although what she believes (that it is raining) cannot be the (explanatory) reason why she takes her umbrella, that she believes it is raining can.
25
So much for the distinction between explanation and justification, the difference between reasons why S did A and S's reasons for doing A. T o see how it plays out in an example more relevant to present concerns, and to anticipate its eventual use in a criterion for consciousness, consider the following situation. A subject in a psychological experiment is told to press the right button if the target, x, is vertical, the left button if it is horizontal. On the first trial S presses the right button. When asked why she pressed the right button, S (puzzled by the question since x is plainly visible to everyone) says, "Because x was vertical." Given her instructions, and being a cooperative subject, that was her reason, her justification, for pushing the right button. On the next set of trials exposure time is reduced. S is instructed as before: press the right button if x is vertical, the left if it is horizontal. S protests that she can no longer see x. She is asked to guess.
She presses the right button. When asked why she pressed the right button, she says impatiently that it was just a guess. She had no reason. As she understands her instructions, she doesn't need a reason. She was, after all, instructed to guess and, for guessing purposes, one button is as good as the other. If we are convinced (by, say, a history of correct guesses at this exposure time) that S, despite her failure to realize it, perceives x (is receiving information about x in some primary way) we have, according to s T a , a case of perception (of x) without awareness (of x). Although Perception Without Awareness 31
x's orientation is obviously influencing S's guesses (why else is she right so often? ) its vertical orientation is clearly not S's justification or reason for pressing the right button. She doesn't have a reason for pressing the right (as opposed to the left) button. She is just guessing. 26 That is why she wouldn't venture a judgment un less "forced." That x is vertical, or that she perceives it to be vertical, may be the explanation of why she pushes the right button, but S herself has no reasons, no justifying reasons, for pushing the right button or, if she does, her reasons are not related to x's orientation. Aside from the differences between explanatory and justifying reasons already described, there is another striking difference: although F (some fact) can explain why S does A without S being aware of F, F cannot justify S in doing A unless S is aware of F. Justifying reasons, unlike explanatory reasons, are facts (or, in the case of justifying reasons, putative facts 27 ) that one is necessarily conscious of. If S isn't aware that it is raining, the fact that it is raining cannot be her reason for saying or thinking that it is raining. It can't be her reason for taking her umbrella. That it is raining might still explain why (in a forced choice situation) S says it is raining. It might be the reason why she takes her umbrella. But it can't be S's reason for taking her umbrella-not if she is unaware of this fact.
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If we combine this fact-the fact that one is necessarily aware of justifying reasons--with the plausible assumption that for those who perceive x, awareness of facts about x requires awareness of x itself, we get the following sufficient condition for awareness of a stimulus: S is consciously aware of x if for some action A or belief P the fact (or putative fact) that x is F is S's (justifying) reason for doing A or believing P. Conscious perception of x, perception of x with awareness of x, occurs when information (necessary for perception of x) becomes S's justification for belief or action. Call this principle J.
Notice, first, that although s T a and J render the same verdict in many cases, they render it for quite different reasons. J is, or at least it is intended to be, less demanding than s T a . J does not require, as does s T a , that a subject believe she perceives x in order to be aware of x. All J requires is that information about x (that it is vertical, say) be S's justifying reason for doing (or believing) something, and this might be true of someone--a child or an animal, say--who lacks
an understanding of what it means to be conscious and who cannot, therefore, satisfy s T a . As long as the animal or child can do things for reasons, as long as it can be motivated to act by having reasons to act, we can have grounds (according to J) for inferring that it is conscious of x even though it cannot think it is. If we are convinced that Fido, who just saw the cat run up this tree, has reasons for barking under this tree, and we are convinced, moreover, that his reason is that this is the tree (he saw) the cat ran up, then J tells us that Fido was conscious of the cat when it ran up this tree. As long as information about the cat--that it ran up this tree--is Fido's reason for barking here, Fido must not only have seen the cat run up this tree (and be acting on this information), he must have been aware of the cat when it ran up the tree. This is perception with awareness. J delivers this verdict for animals that lack an understanding of what it means to see things and, therefore, cannot (as required by s T a ) judge themselves aware of a cat.
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As this example is intended to illustrate, J does not require of the fact, F, that is S's reason for doing A that S believe (think, know, judge) that F. Belief, and the concepts it requires, is n't necessary. Maybe, as some philosophers think, Fido is incapable of having beliefs about cats and trees. If they are right, dogs don't think. They don't make judgments. If reasons for action, reasons for doing A, have to be states that deploy concepts, then, if these philosophers are right, dogs don't have reasons for the things they do. That doesn't mean they are not conscious, that they aren't aware of things. Fido might still see a cat run up a tree, but, lacking concepts, he couldn't see that (hence, know and believe that) a cat ran up the tree. If these philosophers are right (I don't think they are, but I set aside that quarrel for now), Fido is not barking under the tree because he thinks a cat ran up this tree. He is caused to bark there, yes. There are reasons Selecting the spoon (as opposed to a knife or a cup) was not just a guess, a forced choice, or a random act. She carefully felt these objects before making her choice. If her choice is rational, something she has a reason to do, then although S may be incapable of verbally communicating her reasons to us, it seems right to say that S's justification for picking out the spoon was that it (the object she saw earlier) was represented-certainly in experience and maybe even in both experience and thought-as a spoon. That it was a spoon or that she saw a spoon is, therefore, her reason for choosing a spoon. If that is her reason, J tells us she was conscious of the spoon. T a , S must be conscious of x, yes, but not because she thinks she is conscious of x (Fido can be conscious of x without thinking he is) but because a fact about x (that she sees it) is the subject's reason for thinking she sees x, a reason she cannot have, according to J, without being conscious of x.
There are, however, problems with J that I have been ignoring. Aside from the fact that J is not really a genuine test (how, for instance, can one tell whether Fido has a justifying reason for barking under the tree) J expresses a sufficient, not a necessary, condition for awareness. We cannot use it, therefore, to establish what we set out to establish--conditions in which a person perceives x but is not aware of x. We can be certain that S is aware of x if S has, as her reason for doing A (or believing P), information about x, but if she doesn't do anything that has a fact about x as her reason, J is completely silent on the question of whether S is conscious of x. She might be or she might not be. S might be aware of the vertical stripes, but the fact that they are vertical may not be relevant to any of S's current plans or projects. There is nothing S is doing, or plans to do, or wants to do, for which their verticality is relevant. If we wanted to find out whether S was aware of these (vertical) stripes, we would have to arrange for S to do something for which their orientation was relevant. If S is cooperative, we could simply ask her whether x is vertical and assume that, if she gets it right (and isn't just guessing) the fact that x is vertical is her reason for saying it is vertical. With animals and uncooperative subjects the task is harder. If S does nothing that has information about x as her justification, however, given only J, we are left to speculate about whether S is conscious of x. J is of no help. It certainly doesn't tell us that S is not aware of x.
To rectify this problem (it may be just papering over the problem) and secure a necessary condition for awareness we need to say that S is aware of x if and only if information about x is available to S as a reason. It is the availability of information for rationalizing and motivating intentional action (even if one is not capable of such action--e.g. paralyzed or buried in cement), not its actual use, that makes it conscious. We need something like the following (superscript "r"
standing for a reason test):
r T a : S is aware of X = S perceives X, and information about X is available to S as reason (justification) for doing w hat she wants (chooses, decides) to do.
Securing a condition for awareness that is both sufficient and necessary comes at a price. 
At this short exposure time, when asked to report as many letters as they can (the "whole report" condition), subjects identify at most four letters no matter how many letters are in the array. So if we took the number of letters they could identify as the number of letters they were aware of, we would have to conclude that, when exposed for 50 milliseconds to an array of nine letters, subjects were aware of, at most, fou r of them. Nonetheless, when asked 29 , after removal of the stimulus, to identify the letters in only a single row (the "partial report" condition) subjects could often identify every letter in the row no matter which row they were asked about. In the part ial report condition, then, subjects could identify any letter in the entire set despite being able to identify, at most, only four letters in the full report condition. This is not a case of attention being drawn to the queried row since the signal for which row to report occurs after removal of the stimulus. There is no longer anything out there (where the stimulus was) for their attention to be drawn to. Rather, subjects extract this information from what they describe as a conscious but rapidly fadin g image ("icon") that persists for a short time after removal of the stimulus. They use the information embodied in this conscious experience to identify letters in a stimulus that is no longer physically present. Sperling (1960: 20) concludes that: "A calculation of the information available to the Ss for their partial reports indicates that between two and three times more information is available for partial reports than for whole reports." If more information is available than subjects can use, Perception Without Awareness 38
Sperling continues, they must choose a part to remember. In doing so, they choose a part to forget (23). Although this information is lost before being used, this information is nonetheless there, available to a subject (as revealed by the partial reports), in conscious experience, at the time (and shortly thereafter) the letters are seen. It is there, available as a reason to do (say) one thing rather than another. Sperling's brilliance consists of his finding the circumstances--partial rather than full report--in which information about each letter (though not information about all letters) could be used as a reason.
If we interpret these results as showing that subjects are perceptually conscious of more letters than they can (with such brief exposure) identify, that there is more information in their conscious experience of the letter-array than they can (in a "full report" mode) cognitively process and report on, we might use a similar procedure to demonstrate that a subject allegedly "blind" to differences is actually aware of the objects (e.g., Sam) that constitute the difference. After seeing the second (8 member) group, but before the "icon" (conscious experience) fades, a subject might be prompted by an arrow pointing at the position (formerly) occupied by Sam and asked, "Was anyone standing here?" If the answer is "Yes," it seems reasonable to conclude that the subject was, at the time she was looking at this group, consciously aware of Sam. If the same is true of the other seven people (this could be tested in the same way), we can conclude from this collection of "partial" reports that S was aware of all seven people on the first occasion, all eight on the second, but unaware (in full-report mode, as it were) that there was a difference in the n umber of people she was aware of. The availability of reasons and, thus (according to r T a ), the difference in S's conscious experiences, is revealed by the "partial" reports, but not by the "full" or "whole" report.
S cannot say, in full-report mode, whether there are differences in the scene, but by concentrating 7 I include a subject's judgments (beliefs, knowledge, thoughts) as a legitimate part of a test for awareness because I assume, for convenience, sincerity (subjects believe what they say) and cooperation (subjects say what they believe relevant). In my way of proceeding, then, a judgment (that P) is equivalent to a report (that P), a more or less obvious piece of behavior. If readers find this objectionable, substitute "report" for "belief" and make the corresponding adjustment in the evidential status (less direct and, therefore, less reliable) of the test result. . 8 We have to add this qualification because, given our awareness-neutral test for perception (viz., T p ), S might believe she perceives x in this sense by being told she perceives x. Blindsighters, in fact, come to believe they perceive objects in this sense in this way. This, clearly, isn't enough to become consciously aware of the things perceived.
19 Contrary to what O' Regan and Noë (2001) suggest, the real question about change blindness is not whether one sees (or is aware of) everything in a complex scene (surely not!), but whether one can see (and be aware of) more of the elements, more of the detail, than one realizes. If there is anything (not everything, but anything) one can be aware of without realizing one is aware of it, then blindness to differences (failure to realize, notice, or believe that there is a difference) shows absolutely nothing, by itself, about what objects one is aware of. Change blindness is blindness to facts (a cognitive deficit), not necessarily (although it may sometimes be explained by) blindness to objects (a visual deficit). Although failure to see an object can explain why one doesn't notice it, there are other explanations. I am aware of nothing in the change blindness literature (other than an implicit acceptance of s T a --the criterion now in question) that shows that the cognitive failures they exhibit (not noticing differences that are plainly visible) are produced by a failure to consciously see the objects and/or features that make up these differences. 20 Brewer (1999: 44-45) and Campbell (2002: 133) argue (and I agree with them) that demonstrative reference requires awareness of that to which reference is made. 21 E.g., when shown otherwise identical pictures of a house one of which has flames coming from the left side of the house, neglect patients will deny seeing any difference in the pictures, but they will consistently "prefer" the picture of the house that isn't burning (Palmer 1999 : 637)--thus indicating that they are getting information about that part of the house (the left side) that they neglect. 22 It is known that information from unattended (therefore, unnoticed and unreported) stimuli is often processed to a very high degree (Shapiro and Luck 1999; Kanwisher, Yin, and Wojciulik 1999; Potter 1999 ). Beck and colleagues. (2001: 649) report finding face-specific activity in the brain when subjects are "blind" to ("unaware of" according to s T a ) the change this activity signifies, indicating that, in some sense, the brain is registering changes that subjects report no experience of. Also see Shiffrin, et. al. (1996: 226) discussion of the "flanker effect. 23 Significantly, Driver and Vuilleumier (2001: 116) report that many researchers have attempted to resolve these paradoxical results by proposing that the deficits exhibited in neglect and extinction may be more "attentional" than "sensory." 24 I should register here a small departure from an account of reasons with which I am sympathetic. Basically I agree with Dancy (2000; also see Dancy, Wallace, Darwall, et. al. 2003) and Moran (2001: 128 ) that S's reason (for taking her umbrella, for instance) is the fact that it is raining, not the fact that S sees (or believes) that it is raining. It is what S perceives or thinks (that it is raining), the content of her perceptual or cognitive state, not her perceiving or thinking that it is raining, that is her reason. Believing that it is raining may be necessary for the fact that it is raining to be her reason (it, so to speak, enables the fact that it is raining to be S's reason), but believing that it is raining is not, thereby, her (justifying) reason.
What about false beliefs? What if S takes her umbrella because she mistakenly thinks it is raining? Since S would still (given what she thinks) give as her reason the "fact" that it is raining, this "fact" is still, in my sense, a justifying reason. As I read Dancy, he would deny that this is a reason. Under normal conditions (i.e., when use of an umbrella is to protect one from rain) one has no reason to take an umbrella when it isn't raining no matter what one happens to think. One might think one has a reason, but one doesn't. Whether or not Dancy is right about this (I think there is a sense of "reason" in which he is) I merely note that I am using the notion of a (justifying) reason more inclusively-as what is believed or experienced whether or not wh at is represented as true is true. In my sense, that it is raining can be S's reason for taking her umbrella even when it isn't raining. If she thinks it is raining, or it sounds like it is raining, and S take her umbrella, in part, because things seem this way to her, then that it is raining is (among) her (justifying) reason(s) for taking her umbrella. 25 On a causal theory of knowledge, when S knows it is raining, her belief that it is raining is caused by the rain. In this special case, then, justifying reasons are (remote) causes of behavior. S's reason for taking her umbrella--that it is raining--is the cause of her belief that it is raining, and the belief (causally) explains why she takes her umbrella. . 26 Hurley (1998: 148) puts the same point in terms of intentions: "When you guess on cue about a stimulus you are not conscious of, you guess intentionally. But information about the very stimulus in question does not feature in the content of your intentional guess in the same way it does when you intentionally report a stimulus you are conscious of, or when you act on it spontaneously. If information is conscious, you can report or act spontaneously on it: you can have the background intention to push the lever if, say, a light flashes, and you can then push it intentionally just because the light has flashed. More generally, if information is conscious then you can form an intention whose content is provided in part by that information and act on it just for the reason that information provides. Conscious information is available as an effective reason for acting. This is not the case when you can only guess on cue; the information in question does not activate your intention, or provide your reason for acting intentionally. You do not have in tentional access to the information you can only respond to by guessing on cue." 27 I hereafter concentrate on facts, the content of true beliefs and veridical experiences. I will, therefore, drop the distracting "or putative fact." It is to be understood, however, that S's justifying reasons need not be true. In the ideal situation, S's justifying reason (that it is raining, for instance) will be the content of a true belief, a belief that is part of the explanatory reason why S behaves the way she does (takes her umbrella or says that it is raining), but things aren't always optimal.
